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The Red Sea Crisis: Why Ships Stopped Taking the Shortcut

Published · 18 min

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In late 2026, a handful of container ships are cautiously testing the Red Sea again. Most of the world's container fleet still is not. This video explains why, in a crisis that keeps resetting rather than ending.

The Suez Canal and the Red Sea corridor behind it normally carry about 12% of world maritime trade and 30% of Asia-Europe container volume. That shortcut broke on 19 November 2023, when Houthi forces from Yemen hijacked the car carrier Galaxy Leader and opened a sustained campaign of missile, drone and boarding attacks on merchant shipping. Within weeks, Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd - the world's four biggest container lines - all suspended Red Sea transits and rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope instead.

That detour adds roughly 7 to 14 extra days and far more fuel, and pushed war-risk insurance to 0.5-1.0% of a ship's hull value, against about 0.0001% for a comparable Persian Gulf voyage (S&P Global Commodity Insights, 25 September 2024). Shanghai-Rotterdam freight rates roughly quadrupled, from about $1,050 to about $4,680 per forty-foot container between September 2023 and September 2024 (Drewry World Container Index).

A lull followed the last attack of that phase, on 29 September 2025 - but by January 2026, Suez Canal traffic was still 60% below 2023 levels, 100 days on (BIMCO). The calm broke again on 28 February 2026, when US and Israeli strikes on Iran led Houthi forces to resume targeting shipping; a month later, on 28 March 2026, the Houthis formally joined the wider Iran war. A June 2026 ceasefire between the US and Iran stopped that war, but not a separate Houthi campaign: an embargo on Saudi exports in July, a deadly attack on the cargo ship Tihamah in August, and by September 2026, the seizure of the Mayyun, Hanish and Zuqar islands that command the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

Even so, some carriers have started edging back. By September 2026, the Gemini Cooperation (Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd) had returned four more services to Suez, reaching roughly 27% of pre-crisis Red Sea container routing; by October, canal-wide traffic of all kinds was up, though still running at about half its pre-crisis weekly rate. The video closes on the open question its angle poses: is the world building lasting redundancy into its supply chains, or quietly accepting a slower, costlier shipping as the price of doing business - and the record so far does not point cleanly to either answer.

Educational documentary. Not financial or investment advice.

In these topics

Chapters

  1. A fragile calm, tested
  2. Why this is the shortcut
  3. November 2023: the attacks begin
  4. The big four pull out
  5. What the long way round actually costs
  6. Freight rates spike
  7. A tentative pause
  8. February 2026: the US-Israeli strikes reopen it
  9. The Houthis join the Iran war
  10. A ceasefire holds, the sea doesn't fully reopen
  11. Carriers edge back, cargo doesn't
  12. Shortcut or new normal?

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Sources and credits

Photo credits (Wikimedia Commons)

Primary sources

  • gCaptain, 'Suez Canal Traffic Stalls at 60% Below Normal Despite 100 Days Without Houthi Attacks', citing BIMCO - published 7 January 2026 (describes the January 2026 state, not September), reporting the 100-day/60%-below figure and Niels Rasmussen's quote.
  • gCaptain, 'Houthis Signal Renewed Red Sea Shipping Attacks After U.S.-Israeli Strikes on Iran', late February/early March 2026 - the 28 February 2026 strikes and Iran directing the Houthis to resume shipping attacks.
  • Maritime Executive, 'Xeneta: Ocean Carriers Unlikely to Return to Red Sea in 2026', 2 March 2026 - Peter Sand's quote and Maersk/CMA CGM's renewed suspension.
  • S&P Global Commodity Insights, 'Cape of Good Hope reroutes likely to persist well into 2025 as industry adapts: ONE CEO', 25 September 2024 - the 7-14 extra days, ~40% longer, war-risk insurance figures and Jeremy Nixon's quote.
  • Drewry World Container Index, Shanghai-Rotterdam spot rate, as reported by JOC/Hellenic Shipping News/FreshPlaza, September 2024 - ~$1,050/FEU (Sep 2023) to ~$4,680/FEU (Sep 2024).
  • Coface, 'Houthi attacks in the Red Sea: why maritime trade is still not smooth sailing', 2024 - the pre-crisis ~12%/30% baseline.
  • Wikipedia, '2026 Houthi strikes on Israel'; Long War Journal, March and September 2026 - the 28 March 2026 Houthi entry into the Iran war, and the September 2026 seizure of Yemen's Red Sea coast.
  • Ahram Online, 'Six killed in Houthi strike on ship in Red Sea: Yemen coastguard', 11 August 2026 - the Tihamah attack.
  • Euronews, 'Houthis capture more Yemeni Red Sea islands, tightening grip on Bab el-Mandeb', 14 September 2026; Asharq Al-Awsat, September 2026 - Mayyun, Hanish and Zuqar islands seized.
  • Seatrade Maritime / Container News, 'Gemini brings four services back to Red Sea / Suez route', September 2026; ChemAnalyst, 'Red Sea Routing Hits 27% Normalization...', September 2026 - the AE5/AE11/AE12/ME2 services and the ~27% normalisation figure.
  • circuit.news, 'Red Sea calm revives shipping traffic through Suez Canal', October 2026, citing Clarksons and the Suez Canal Authority - the >200 ships, +14% revenue and ~244/week October 2026 figures.

Not regulated financial advice.